State v. Rye Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 41710 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-15-2014
State v. Rye Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41710
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Rye Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41710" (2014). Not Reported. 1769.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1769
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 














Canyon Co. Case No. 
CR-2013-7753 
GROVER RYE, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
______________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
HONORABLE MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1 
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5 
Rye Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's 
Interpretation Of I.C. § 18-8309(1) As Requiring Him To 
Update His Registration Information Within Two Days Of 
Leaving His Last Registered Address ................................................... 5 
A. lntroduction ................................................................................. 5 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................... 5 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded Rye Was 
Subject To The Two-Day Registration Requirement 
Of I.C. § 18-8309(1) ................................................................... 5 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................... 9 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 286 P.3d 537 (2012) ............................................... 5 
State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 79 P.3d 719 (2003) ........................................ 5 
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 
265 P.3d 502 (2011) ................................................................................. 5 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-8303 ...................................................................................................... 7 
I.C. § 18-8304 ....................................................................................................... 1 
I.C. § 18-8307 ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.C. § 18-8308 ............................................................................................... 2, 6, 7 
I.C. § 18-8309 ............................................................................................. passim 
I.C. § 18-8311 ....................................................................................................... 1 
II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Grover Rye, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional 
guilty plea to failure to register as a sex offender. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Rye is a registered sex offender. (R., p.5; PSI, p.3.) As of March 11, 
2013, Rye's registered place of residence was the Light House Rescue Mission 
("the Lighthouse") in Nampa, Idaho. (Id.) On March 15, 2013, staff at the 
Lighthouse informed law enforcement that "Rye had left [their] facility on 3/11/13 
and had not returned." (Id.) Law enforcement attempted to locate Rye but were 
unable to do so until April 1, 2013, when Rye was "arrested for an offense." (Id.) 
During an interview with law enforcement, Rye admitted that, after he left the 
Lighthouse, he went to Nevada for a few days, then returned to Idaho and 
stayed with friends in Canyon and Owyhee Counties. (PSI, p.3.) Rye also 
admitted he never updated his registration information after he left the 
Lighthouse. (Id.) 
The state charged Rye with failure to register as a sex offender, in 
violation of I.C. §§ 18-8304, 18-8307, 18-8308, 18-8309 and 18-8311. (R., 
pp.18-19.) Specifically, the Information alleged that Rye, 
on or about the 11 th day of March, 2013, in the County of Canyon, 
State of Idaho, after establishing residence in Canyon County, has 
failed to update his registration information within two working days 
as required by statute, after having been convicted of the crime of 
Sexual Batter[y] On A Minor Child, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
18-1508A. 
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(R., p.19.) The state also filed an Information Part 11, alleging Rye was a 
persistent violator. (R., pp.24-25.) 
Before trial, the parties asked the district court to resolve an issue of 
statutory interpretation, to wit: Whether Rye - who was subject to sex offender 
registration and had registered the Lighthouse as his place of residence - was 
subject to the requirement of I.C. § 18-8309(1) that he update his registration 
information within two working days of leaving the Lighthouse, or whether he had 
seven days to do so, as contemplated by I.C. § 18-8308(4). (Tr., p.5, L.9 - p.6, 
L.6.) Following a hearing on the issue, the district court determined that Rye was 
subject to the two-day registration requirement of I.C. § 18-8309(1). (R., pp.37-
38; Tr., p.23, L.22 - p.27, L.12.) Specifically, the court ruled: 
[U]nder [I. C.] § 18-8309 when an individual registers but then 
leaves his/her registered address, the offender shall appear within 
two (2) working days to notify the sheriff. Thus, upon leaving the 
Lighthouse, the Defendant would have had two (2) days to inform 
the Canyon County Sheriff's Office he was no longer living at the 
Lighthouse and give them an address or location where he was 
staying. If the Defendant did not have an address to go to, under 
[I.C.] § 18-8308(4), the Defendant must go to the sheriff every 
seven days to check in. The Court finds an individual cannot avoid 
[the] registration requirement just because they are homeless. 
Thus, the statute is clear and Defendant did have an obligation to 
update his registration. 
(R., p.37.) 
Following the district court's ruling, Rye entered a conditional guilty plea to 
failure to register as a sex offender, reserving the right on appeal to challenge 
the district court's interpretation of the relevant statutes; in exchange, the state 
dismissed the persistent violator enhancement and agreed to cap its 
recommendation as to the determinate portion of Rye's sentence at one and 
2 
one-half years. (R., pp.39-51, 59; Tr., p.32, L.13 - p.49, L.18.) In recognition 
that Rye "probably did not intend to break the law in this particular case," the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half 
years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Rye on probation for a 
period of three years. (R., pp.60-62; Tr., p.67, L.1 - p.68, L.16.) Rye timely 
appealed. (R., pp.63-65.) 
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ISSUE 
Rye states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court misinterpret Idaho Code § 18-8309 as 
requiring Mr. Rye to notify the county sheriff within two days of 
leaving his residence, even though Mr. Rye had become homeless 
and/or left the State? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Rye failed to show error in the district court's interpretation of I.C. § 18-
8309(1) as requiring Rye to update his registration information within two days of 
leaving his last registered address? 
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ARGUMENT 
Rye Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Interpretation Of 
I.C. § 18-8309(1) As Requiring Him To Update His Registration Information 
Within Two Days Of Leaving His Last Registered Address 
A. Introduction 
"Mindful of the plain language of the relevant statutes," Rye argues "the 
district court erroneously concluded that, pursuant to l.C. § 18-8309, he was 
required to notify the Canyon County Sheriff's office that he was no longer living 
at the Lighthouse, within two days of leaving." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Rye's 
argument fails. The plain language of I.C. § 18-8309(1) supports the district 
court's conclusion that Rye was required to update his registration information 
within two days of leaving the Lighthouse, which was Rye's last registered 
address. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, 561, 286 
P.3d 537, 539 (2012). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded Rye Was Subject To The Two-Day 
Registration Requirement Of I.C. § 18-8309(1) 
"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the 
statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and 
the statute must be construed as a whole."' Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting State v. 
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). '"If the statute is not 
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ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as 
written."' kl 
Idaho Code § 18-8309 governs the duty of sex offenders to update their 
registration information and provides, in relevant part: 
(1) If an offender subject to registration changes his or her 
name, street address or actual address, employment or student 
status, the offender shall appear in person within two (2) working 
days after the change at the office of the sheriff of the county 
where the offender is required to register and notify the sheriff of all 
changes in the information required for that offender in the sex 
offender registry. . . . Within three (3) working days after receipt of 
the notice, the sheriff shall notify the department of the changed 
information and the department shall notify all other counties and 
jurisdictions in which the offender is required to register. An 
offender satisfies the notification requirements set forth in this 
subsection if he or she appears in another jurisdiction in which 
registration is required and notifies that jurisdiction of the changed 
information. 
I.C. § 18-8309(1 ). As found by the district court, the language of this statute is 
unambiguous and plainly requires a sex offender who changes his or her 
address to notify the county sheriff within two working days of the change. 
Because it is undisputed that "Rye was subject to registration, had a residence, 
and then left his residence" (Appellant's brief, p.7), the district court correctly 
concluded Rye was required under I.C. § 18-8309(1) to update his registration 
information within two days of leaving his last registered address. 
Rye does not seriously contend otherwise. Instead he adopts his trial 
counsel's argument that, because Rye allegedly had no permanent residence 
after leaving the Lighthouse, his duty to register "should fall under the 
requirements under 18-8308(4), that he report in person ... once every seven 
6 
days with the sheriff." (Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.5; see also Appellant's brief, 
pp.7-8.) Rye's argument is without merit. 
Idaho Code§ 18-8308(4) states: 
(4) A sexual offender who does not provide a physical 
residence address at the time of registration shall report, in person, 
once every seven (7) days to the sheriff of the county in which he 
resides. Each time the offender reports to the sheriff, he shall 
complete a form provided by the department that includes the 
offender's name, date of birth, social security number and a 
detailed description of the location where he is residing. The sheriff 
shall visit the described location at least once each month to verify 
the location of the offender. 
I.C. § 18-8308(4). Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, the seven-day 
reporting requirement applies only to sexual offenders who do not provide a 
physical residence address at the time of registration. 
In this case, it is undisputed that Rye had registered the Lighthouse's 
address as his physical residence. 1 Because Rye had registered a physical 
residence address, he was required by the plain language of I.C. § 18-8309(1) to 
notify the county sheriff within two days of leaving that address that he no longer 
resided there. As found by the district court, if, at that time, Rye did not have a 
new physical address to report, the requirements of I.C. § 18-8308(4) would 
have been triggered and he would thereafter have been required to report to the 
sheriff every seven days and provide a detailed description of the location where 
he was residing. (See R., p.37 ("If the Defendant did not have an address to go 
to, under [I.C.] § 18-8308(4), the Defendant must go to the sheriff every seven 
1 For purposes of the sex offender registration statutes, a "residence" is defined 
as "the offender's present place of abode." I.C. § 18-8303(15). 
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days to check in."); Tr., p.25, L.25 - p.26, L.9 (Rye was required to notify the 
sheriff within two days of leaving his registered address and "if at that time [he] 
did not have a physical address, then under subsection 18-8308(4), the sheriff 
would have instructed [him] to report every seven days.").) 
The plain and unambiguous language of I.C. § 18-8309(1) supports the 
district court's determination that Rye was required to update his registration 
information within two days of leaving his last registered address. Rye has failed 
to show any basis for reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Rye's conviction and 
sentence. 
DATED this 15th day of October, 2014. 
ORI A FLEM~G 
Deputy Attorne~I 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of October, 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
Deputy Attorney Gen al 
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